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ABSTRACT 
 
The development and evaluation of Human-System Interfaces (HSIs) for control rooms is a research area at the 
Human-System Interface Laboratory (LABIHS).  The main objective of this laboratory is to develop and evaluate 
projects of HSIs for industrial plants using different methodology construction.  The evaluation of the interfaces 
is carried out in the LABIHS simulator at the Nuclear Engineering Institute (IEN).  Previous evaluation of the 
overview screen of the nuclear power plant (NPP) simulator of the LABIHS showed the necessity of additional 
information to reduce the operator workload.  To overcome this issue, a set of three 52-inch LCD TV was acquired 
to replace the projector in the task of showing the overview screen to the simulator operators.  A new set of screens 
was developed to gather information in the three LCD screens.  The approach used on the development of the new 
screens was based on human factors guidelines and recommendations.  The objective of this work is present the 
design of these new overview screens and to evaluate their contribution to reduce the operators mental workload 
in this new scenario. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In a digital control room, the operators have to swap among several screens in order to control 
the plant.  Display screen information on monitors causes problems for the operators because 
only part of the process is visible at any one time causing the need of swapping around the 
screens continuously.  This problem is called “keyhole effect” and can lead to a cognitive 
workload to the operators to figure out the current state of the plant.  The goals of the overview 
screen are to show the main components of the plant and to minimize the cognitive workload 
due to information integration performed by the operators during the screens swapping process. 
 
The HSIs are important parts of an industrial plant in which the operator interact to carry 
through its functions and tasks.  The HSIs manly include alarms, displays of information and 
controls.  Based upon the literature, interviews and site visits, O’Hara et al. [1] identified 
changes in HSI technology and their potential effect on personnel performance.  The topics 
were then evaluated for their potential safety significance.  The interface design was one of 
HSI technology that was found to be potentially safety significant. 
 
Moreover, the control systems of industrial plants are increasing their complexity that makes it 
more difficult to design the corresponding operation interfaces of these plants. 
 
The development and evaluation of HSIs for control rooms is one of research area at LABIHS 
laboratory.  The main objective of this research is to develop and evaluate projects of human-
system interfaces for industrial plants using different methodology construction.  The design 
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of new interfaces is based on guidelines [2] for project of human-system interface as well as 
human factors engineering issues.  The evaluation of the interfaces is carried out in the LABIHS 
simulator at IEN. 
 
In this work, three new overview screens for the LABIHS simulator was developed, taking into 
account these guidelines and recommendations of human factors engineering.  These new 
screens were evaluated using the E-0 procedure of the plant emergency operation 
procedures (EOPs) [3]. 
 
 
2. HUMAN-SYSTEM INTERFACES LABORATORY 
 
The LABIHS simulator is a set of equipment and software that simulates the electrical 
generation process of a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) of a NPP of 930 MWe.  A set of soft 
panels that mimic the main circuits of the NPP composes the simulator, where the operators 
can interact and control the plant, connected through a local area network to a workstation, 
where the NPP simulator is running.  A Reactor Operator – RO, a Secondary Circuit Operator 
– SCO, and a Shift Supervisor – SS, compose the LABIHS simulator teamwork.  Each operator 
controls and monitors the systems under his/her responsibility using a set of different 
interfaces: screen, mouse and keyboard.  An overview of the process under control is available 
to the operators in the front wall of the original control room and in three LCD TVs of the 
improved control room.  The instructor simulates events for the working crew in a dedicated 
instructor console located at a room overlooking the simulator control room.  Fig. 1a and 1b 
show the original and the improved NPP simulator control room of the LABIHS, respectively. 
 
 
  
(a) (b) 
  
Figure 1:  LABIHS simulator: (a) Original control room; (b) Improved control room. 
 
 
3. THE NEW OVERVIEW SCREENS 
 
Overview screens of a digital control room of any industrial plant has two main goals: to present 
to the operator the main components of the plant and minimize the information integration 
between operation screens by the operators (keyhole effect).  The software HSI Builder [4] is 
used to design operation interfaces for the LABIHS simulator.  The HSI Builder is a dedicated 
tool for design new operation interfaces for industrial plants.  Several libraries were created for 
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this software with components prototypes used in soft panels of industrial plants.  The software 
was built over the commercial ILOG package for UNIX platform, in order to facilitate the 
development of new operation screens. 
 
Three new overview screens were developed to the LABIHS simulator.  The left overview 
screen shows the conditions of the plant with respect to its status, such as trip alarms, systems 
alarms, control and permissive alarms.  Two computerized operator support systems show the 
status tree of the critical safety function and the accident/transient identification support 
system.  The middle overview screen shows an overview of the plant process and 
instrumentation (P&I) thermo-hydraulic processes.  The right overview screen shows the 
graphics of the pressure versus temperature in the primary loop (P-T Curve), the top view of 
the reactor core, showing the bars position of the Control Banks & Shutdown Banks, and the 
plant operation mode as well. 
 
3.1.  The central overview screen 
 
Fig. 2 presents the original overview screen of the simulator.  In the design phase of this 
interface screen, no consideration was taken into account to satisfy the guidelines of HSI.  A 
new overview screen for the simulator was developed based on the same methodology of 
construction used in the original one.  Fig. 3 presents the new overview screen for the simulator.  
For design of this new screen, caution was taken to follow the guidelines requirements for HSI 
as well as some plant specialists’ recommendations.  Reference [5] gives more information 
about the design and evaluation of this screen. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Original thermo-hydraulic center overview screen. 
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Figure 3:  Improved thermo-hydraulic center overview screen. 
 
3.2.  The left overview screen 
 
The new left overview screen integrates information about the status of the plant alarms (TRIP 
ALARMS and non-trip ALARMS), the control-permissive actuation (C-P STATUS), the 
critical functions status tree (CFST) violation, and the identification of the transient/accident 
in the plant (PLANT CONDITION).  Fig. 4 presents the new developed left overview screen 
and Fig. 5 the screens used by the operator where information met to compose this screen. 
 
3.2.1 Trip and non-trip alarms 
 
In the original simulator, the alarms are located on two separate specific alarm screens (Fig. 5a 
and 5b).  They are arranged as tiles in a grid where active alarms are indicated by a flashing 
red tile (Fig. 5a).  This arrangement reproduces in the simulator the main alarm annunciation 
tiles used in the reference plant.  The existing system does not support quick alarm 
identification.  The alarm set indicator does not provide any detailed information about the 
activator of the alarm that is sounding (the same situation that occurs in the actual plant).  The 
operator must always navigate to both alarm screens to determine which alarms were activated.  
Additionally, the grid arrangement has no apparent organization or order.  Related alarms are 
not grouped according to plant systems nor are separated by loops (primary and secondary 
circuits of the plant) across the two alarm screens.  Finally, all alarms are displayed identically, 
making it difficult to distinguish between alarms based on severity and importance.  All alarms 
are annunciated by the same sound. 
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Figure 4:  Left overview screen. 
 
 
  
 
(a) (b) (c) 
 
 
 
                  (d)                     (e) 
 
Figure 5:  Operation screens used to compose the left overview screen: (a) Alarm 1; 
(b) Alarm 2; (c) Status; (d) CFST; and (e) Plant condition. 
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The new overview interface includes a revision of the original alarm system.  Alarms have 
been grouped into only one panel, and split into trip and non-trip alarms.  The top part of Fig. 4 
presents the trip alarms.  The trip alarms have been split into two parts, distinguishing alarms 
related to primary loop (reactor trip alarms) from alarms related to secondary loop (turbine trip 
alarms).  The alarms are organized by the location of their activator in the system.  For example, 
the pressurizer water level is located on the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) screen and hence, 
on the alarm screen, it is under the RCS column heading.  The top part of this overview screen 
presents the status of the TRIP alarms for all systems of the plant, under the “TRIP ALARMS” 
title. 
 
For non-trip alarms, we use the same methodology described before to split the alarms into 
primary and secondary circuits, and again the alarms are organized by the location of their 
activator in the system.  For example, the charging flow indicator is located on the Chemical 
and Volume Control System (CVCS) screen and hence, on the alarm screen, it is under the 
CVCS column heading.  The middle part of this overview screen presents the status of the non-
TRIP alarms for all systems of the plant, under the “ALARMS” title. 
 
3.2.2 Control and permissive status 
 
The status of the permissive and control interlocks are located in the simulator in a specific 
screen (Fig. 5c).  They are presented into the overview screen in the bottom left part of this 
screen, and presents the status of the control and permissive interlocks.  The operator uses this 
information in order to control the operation of the power plant.  The control interlock signals 
are used by the automatic systems to keep the plant in a safety condition. The permissive signals 
are provided to the control logic to allow automatic or manually initiate interlocks and bypass 
systems.  The bottom left part of this overview screen presents the status of the control and 
permissive interlocks, under the “STATUS” title. 
 
3.2.3 Critical function status tree 
 
Fig. 5d presents the simulator screen used by the operators to monitor the Critical Safety 
Function (CSF) of the simulated plant.  CSF is the most significant design concept for prioritize 
operator actions based on the potential threat to the three barriers (fuel cladding, primary 
coolant system boundary and containment) and allows the operator to respond to these threats 
prior to event diagnosis.  CSF has a hierarchical information structure that organizes the system 
variables affecting the plant safety in terms of goal-means relations.  It is important for the 
operator to take into account the various success paths associated with each CSF to respond 
quickly to unanticipated failures of the system.  When an emergency occurs in NPPs, the 
operator should monitor CSFs periodically and identify possible success paths as necessary, 
and try to stabilize or safely shut down the plant using emergency operating procedure (EOP) 
that includes steps to check CSFs.  This implies that safety function status check may become 
a cognitively burdensome task that needs to be supported by proper information display.  The 
advanced human-system interface (HSI) in nuclear power plants provides an information 
environment that supports the operators’ burdensome cognitive tasks.  The bottom middle part 
of this overview screen presents the violation alarms of the CSFs, under the “CFST” title.  
Reference [6] gives more information about the design of the implemented CSF system. 
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3.2.4 Transient/accident identification 
 
Fig. 5e presents the simulator screen used to help the operators to identify the type of 
transient/accident in the simulated plant.  Transient identification in NPP is often a very hard 
task and may involve a great amount of human cognition.  The early identification of 
unexpected departures from steady state behavior is an essential step for the operation, control 
and accident management in nuclear power plants.  The basis for the identification of a change 
in the system is that different system faults and anomalies lead to different patterns of evolution 
of the involved process variables.  During an abnormal event, the operator must monitor a great 
amount of information from the instruments, which represents a specific type of event.  In this 
system, we use a neuro-fuzzy modeling tool for efficient transient identification. 
 
The bottom right part of this overview screen presents the transient/accident identification 
alarm system, under the “PLANT CONDITION” title.  Reference [7] gives more information 
about the design of the implemented transient/accident identification system. 
 
3.3.  The right overview screen 
 
The new right overview screen integrates information to the operators about the position of the 
rods of the control and shutdown banks in the reactor core, the thermo-hydraulic operation 
point of the plant in a pressure versus temperature curve (P-T curve), and plant mode operation.  
Fig. 6 presents the new developed right overview screen and Fig. 7 the screens used by the 
operator, where information met to compose this screen. 
 
3.3.1 Rods control system 
 
Fig. 7a shows the top view of the assemblies in the reactor core.  The operators to visualize the 
position of each rod of the control banks and shutdown banks in the core use this simulator 
screen.  Fig. 7b shows the rod control system screen used to the operators to monitor and control 
the reactor power.  The rod control system may be operated in either manual or automatic at 
discretion of the operator.  In automatic operation, the rod control system positions control rods 
within the core in response to signals from the reactor operator or reactor control unit.  The rod 
control system is used for demand following of load, and short-term control of reactor power.  
Boron concentration adjustment is used for long-term control.  During normal operation, the 
shutdown banks of control rods are maintained at the top of the core.  When tripped, the 
shutdown rods are capable of rendering the reactor subcritical under all normal operating 
conditions.  The shutdown banks are always operated manually and do not require an automatic 
control system.  The half-left part of this overview screen presents the rods positions in the 
reactor core and information about the reactor power and its tendency.  Reference [8] gives 
more information about the design and operation this system. 
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Figure 6:  The right overview screen for the simulator. 
 
 
   
(a) (b) (c) 
 
Figure 7:  Operation screens used to compose the right overview screen: (a) Control 
Banks and Shutdown Banks; (b) Rod Control System; (c) P-T Curve. 
 
3.3.2 Pressure versus temperature curve 
 
Pressure-temperature (P-T) curve evaluation defines the maximum allowable pressure for 
different rates of temperature variation with respect to the current coolant temperature.  Fig. 7c 
shows the P-T curve of the primary loop of the reactor.  The operators to visualize the thermo-
hydraulic set point of the reactor primary loop use this simulator screen.  Fig. 8 presents the 
concepts of the P-T curve, where we can see the limits of pressure to be followed by operators 
in order to avoid crossing the line to the area where the system goes from liquid to vapor phase, 
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with respect to the temperature.  The figure shows in red color the expected span area for set 
points for primary, secondary, and tertiary loops of a PWR plant.  The half-right part of this 
overview screen presents the simulator P-T curve.  Reference [9] gives more information about 
the design this screen. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8:  P-T curve. 
 
 
3.3.3 Plant mode operation 
 
All the operation screens of the NPP simulator has at the top left corner the information of the 
plant mode operation to help operators to monitor and control the simulated plant.  Fig. 9 
presents the plant operation modes of the reference NPP in normal situation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9:  The operation modes of the reference NPP in normal situation. 
 
 
The operation modes of a PWR NPP can be state by monitoring a set of nuclear parameters.  
Normally, these parameters are correlated to the reactor reactivity and temperature in the 
primary coolant.  Table 1 presents the operation modes of the simulated plant, i.e., refueling, 
cold shutdown, hot shutdown, hot standby, startup, and power operation, as well as the 
parameters used and the set points to define each operation mode.  The selected parameters are 
the nuclear reactivity, Keff, the rate of thermal power in percentage, and cold-leg temperature, 
Cold 
shutdown
Hot 
shutdown
Hot 
standby 
Power 
operation 
Power 
change
Disturbance 
Refueling 
Starting up 
Shutting down 
Warming up
Cooling down 
Warming up
Cooling down 
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Tcold, in oC.  The bottom half-right part of this overview screen presents the current operation 
mode of the simulated plant, under the “PLANT MODE” title.  Reference [10] gives more 
information about the design of the plant operation modes system. 
 
 
Table 1:  Plant operation modes 
 
Operational mode Reactivity condition 
(Keff) 
Thermal power(1) 
 (%) 
Cold-leg 
temperature (oC) 
1. Power operation ≥ 0.99 > 5% ≥ 177 
2. Startup ≥ 0.99 ≤ 5% ≥ 177 
3. Hot standby < 0.99 0 ≥ 177 
4. Hot shutdown < 0.99 0 177 > Tcold > 99  
5. Cold shutdown < 0.99 0 ≤ 99 
6. Refueling(2) ≤ 0.95 0 ≤ 57 
(1)Excluding decay heat 
(2) Fuel in the reactor vessel with the head removed 
 
 
4. OVERVIEW INTERFACES EVALUATION 
 
The interface evaluation in the LABIHS simulator is based on the operators’ activity analysis 
in normal, alarm, and emergency operation situations.  For evaluation of the new screens, we 
can use, for example, a team of operation acting on a simulated accident at the plant.  To 
perform the screen evaluation the laboratory has video and audio tapping recorder systems to 
record the actions and communication of the operators.  Additionally, the actions (mouse clicks) 
of the operators on the operation screens are automatically logged by the simulator in a file.  
Logs are registers of operation actions done by the operators in the simulator interface, and can 
be used to quantify the number of interfaces screens visited, the number of controls actuated, 
and the time spent in these operations.  The goal of this phase is to achieve details of the 
interaction operators/systems, navigation, tasks performed correctly, time spent in each task, 
mistakes committed and, moreover, verify if the operators received the correct feedback from 
the interface in each operation step. 
 
4.1.  The interfaces evaluation results 
 
To control an extremely complex system such as a NPP it is mandatory to follow some 
operation procedures.  Operators in a NPP control the plant according to the Systems Operation 
Procedures (SOPs) and the General Operation Procedures (GOPs) in normal situation.  When 
an alarm occurs, the operators monitor necessary signals and manipulate appropriate devices 
through the alarm recovery procedure (ARP).  When multiple alarms occur, the operators act 
through the abnormal operation procedure (AOP).  If the reactor is tripped and/or safety 
injection (SI) is operated in an abnormal state, the operators monitor necessary signals and 
manipulate necessary devices to put the NPP in a hot standby (HSB) state through the 
emergency operation procedure (EOP).  The EOP outlines the procedures for emergencies such 
as loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or steam generator tube rupture (SGTR).  Fig. 10 presents 
the mapping of plant state and correspondent operating procedures for NPPs. 
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Figure 10:  Procedure analysis. 
 
 
A preliminary evaluation of the new overview screens was carried out based on the screens 
information presented to the operators to perform the emergency procedure E-0 steps.  The 
operators should operate the plant according to the E-0 procedure when the reactor is tripped 
or SI begins. 
 
Table 2 shows the presented information in the new and original overview screens, for the 
emergency procedure E-0 steps.  The results shown a substantial reduction in the lack of 
information to the operator to perform the E-0 procedure in the new overview screens (lack of 
8/36 steps) compared to the original one (lack of 21/36 steps). 
 
Although the procedure steps 31 to 33 are control action, they were considered in the evaluation 
because the overview screens should present information feedback of the important actions 
done by the operators.  This information will contribute to minimize the information integration 
between operation screens by the operators (keyhole effect), i.e., the whole crew operation will 
have the feedback about the present state of the plant.  Caution must be take about increasing 
information on the screen to prevent cluttering effects. 
 
  
Multiple alarm
Normal state
Alarm
Trip ou SI
AOP
Hot
standbyEOP
Single alarm
ARP
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Table 2:  Overview screens information for the emergency procedure E-0 steps 
 
Step Action/Expected response Overview screens 
Original New 
1 Confirm rector trip No Yes 
2 Confirm turbine trip Yes Yes 
3 Confirm power supply to AC emergency busses No No 
4 Check if SI is actuated No No 
5 Confirm feedwater isolation Yes Yes 
6 Confirm containment isolation phase A No Yes 
7 Confirm auxiliary feedwater pumps running Yes Yes 
8 Confirm safety injection pumps running Yes Yes 
9 Confirm residual heat removal pumps running Yes Yes 
10 Confirm components cooling water pumps running No No 
11 Confirm service water pumps running No Yes 
12 Confirm containment fan coolers running No No 
13 Check if main steam lines should be isolated Yes Yes 
14 Confirm containment spray not required No No 
15 Confirm safety injection flow No Yes 
16 Confirm total auxiliary feedwater flow Yes Yes 
17 Confirm auxiliary feedwater valve alignment Yes Yes 
18 Confirm safety injection valves alignment Yes Yes 
19 Check reactor coolant system temperatures Yes Yes 
20 Check if pressurizer PORVS and spray valves are closed No No 
21 Check if reactor coolant pumps should be stopped Yes Yes 
22 Check if steam generator are not faulted No Yes 
23 Check if steam generator tubes are not ruptured No Yes 
24 Check if reactor coolant system is intact No Yes 
25 Check if safety injection should be terminated Yes Yes 
26 Initiate monitoring of the critical safety functions status trees No Yes 
27 Verify steam generator levels Yes Yes 
28 Verify secondary radiation No Yes 
29 Verify containment building radiation No Yes 
30 Verify temperature and pressure in the pressurizer relieve tank No Yes 
31 Reset safety injection signal No No 
32 Reset containment isolation phase A and phase B signals No Yes 
33 Establish instrument air to the containment No Yes 
34 Check if residual heat removal pumps should be stopped Yes Yes 
35 Check if diesel generator should be stopped No No 
36 Return to step 19 (reactor coolant system temperature) --- --- 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this work, we develop three new overview screens for the LABIHS simulator nuclear plant, 
taking in account norms and recommendations of human factors and engineering.  These new 
screens were evaluated using the plant EOP E-0.  The results show substantial improvement in 
the new LABIHS control room interfaces compared to the original design. 
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The evaluation of these new overview screens will be extended to the analysis of operator’s 
activities in normal and abnormal plant operation conditions using the laboratory infrastructure. 
 
In near future, we plan to apply the same project philosophy of the new overview screens to 
the screens used by the operators to control/monitor the simulated plant. 
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